It is hardly possible to extol the virtues of free enterprise more enthusiastically than does the libertarian John Hospers. As with other ideologies, the variations on libertarianism are numerous, but most libertarians would subscribe to three lines of emphasis:
1. The freedom of individuals to pursue their private interests so long as these do not harm others
2. The denial of the state’s responsibility for all forms of ’public welfare
3. A ”night-watchman” conception of government according to which government should exist solely for the protection from enemy invasion, to prevent infringement on individual rights, to enforce contracts, etc.
What is the secret of this system? In a word, it is liberty: liberty to think, to invent, to produce, to trade. When no restrictions are placed on these things, the ingenuity of man knows no bounds. But almost always in past history, such restrictions have been there: kings, emperors, tribal chieftains, modern governments drain off so much of the energies of the people, especially the creative people, whom they perceive as threats to their power, that the energies of men are sapped and their spirits broken.In itself, libertarianism thus goes much further than simple laissez faire capitalism (it applies the ”hands-off!” to much more); and it certainly espouses the principle of free enterprise.
From: Questions That Matter
Miller, L (ed.) 1996
Rawls, Dworkin, and the utilitarians assumed that government ought to have an active role in bringing about "distributive justice." Nozick questions this assumption. He thinks that any distribution resulting from free transfers of legitimately acquired property will be just. Indeed, Nozick thinks that any attempt by government to interfere with the process of free exchange between individuals would be unjust. For Nozick, the fundamental question that political philosophy must answer is: What justification can we give for there being a state at all, rather than anarchy? Giving an answer to this question, Nozick thinks, is not easy. One might, for example, point out that a "state of nature" without any government could be very bad, and that reasoning would therefore lead one to prefer government as the lesser of two evils. However, if we are to engage in reasoning consistently, we must also consider the worst that could result from government, which could also be very bad.
Thus, reasoning cannot decide between anarchy and government. Rather than consider such worst-case scenarios, Nozick suggests that we think of anarchy in a more positive sense. That is, we should suppose that in a state of nature people generally do what they ought to do, and consider whether government would always be better than anarchy, and could arise without violating anyone's moral rights. If so, then this would provide a justification for the existence of a state. Nozick will eventually argue only a "minimal" state, which exists solely to protect people and their property against aggression, and to preserve the free market, can be justified in this way.
Unlike the other authors we have considered in the course, Gauthier does not attempt to defend his theory of justice based on assumed ethical premises. (Even Nozick based his theory on an ethical assumption, namely that people have certain rights of self-ownership, which he cited to support the existence of inviolable property rights.) Gauthier would like to show that ethics, and thus the theory of distributive justice (which he takes to be part of ethics), can be developed based solely on the notion of mutual advantage through cooperation. In particular, Gauthier wants to show that rational bargaining would lead people to agree to a form of market capitalism, and that it would be rational for them to conform to this agreement. Gauthier’s aims are therefore quite ambitious. Not only does he want to develop a general basis for ethics (Rawls, Dworkin, and Nozick, by contrast, were concerned only with the more limited aim of developing a theory of justice), he also wants to show how ethics can be derived from nonethical assumptions (in particular, the theory of rational bargaining). Thus, Gauthier gives no primacy in his theory to moral rights. In the end, he defends a minimal, nontraditional morality that gives central stage to cooperation based on mutual advantage.
Gauthier’s theory is based on an approach developed by the 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Gauthier wants to show how behaving justly is in everyone's interests. (To be more precise, he wants to define what is just based on what is in everyone's interests.) Thus, Gauthier hopes to solve the compliance problem that plagued Nozick's theory (and Rawls’ theory, too, which never really solves the problem of stability). The problem, as Gauthier sees it, is that it is to everyone's advantage that society exists, but it is also to everyone's advantage to try to enjoy these benefits without paying the costs. People who succumb to this temptation, engaging in noncooperative behavior while enjoying the benefits of social cooperation, are called "free riders." Gauthier’s aim is to argue that in some sense it is ultimately not rational for people to be free riders.
As mentioned earlier, Gauthier’s theory supports a nontraditional, minimal morality based on mutual advantage through cooperation. Neither benevolence nor altruism plays a basic role in Gauthier’s theory. Moreover, power seems to matter in Gauthier’s theory in a way that was not true of any of the other authors we have considered (although he attempts to lessen the influence of power in his description of the initial bargaining position). Because Gauthier’s theory is based on the notion of mutual advantage for real bargainers (who are fully aware of their physical, mental, and social advantages relative to others), people who have greater bargaining power should receive, and deserve to receive, a greater share of social advantages than others according to Gauthier’s theory. Thus, Gauthier’s theory yields no natural rights of "self-ownership" of the sort defended by Nozick.
In Gauthier’s theory, there are no basic moral rights at all. Any rights people have are derived from the basic notion of mutual advantage through cooperation. In other words, people have certain "rights" when (and only when) it is in everyone's interests to treat them as if they had such rights. For example, it is normally in everyone's interests to agree not to physically coerce others, provided that others agree not to physically coerce them. When such an agreement exists, we can legitimately say that people have the "right" not to be physically coerced by others. However, those who for some reason cannot coerce others (perhaps because they are physically weak or disabled) do not pose a credible threat, and it is not immediately obvious, given Gauthier’s views, what reason others could have to refrain from coercing them.
One objection that immediately comes to mind is that a minimal morality such as that espoused by Gauthier is not really morality at all. It is intuitively unjust to mistreat the disabled, regardless of whether it is rational for society to agree to let such mistreatment occur. Indeed, it might be argued, morality exists specifically to keep us from doing what it is sometimes "rational" for us to do, that is, acting always in our self-interests. However, this objection is not completely fair. Gauthier is concerned with how we can convince people to act morally. He thinks that if you cannot show a person that acting morally is ultimately in his interests, it is useless to tell the person that he nevertheless has an "obligation" to do so. An injunction to behave in a certain way only has force when the person already wants to or can be rationally convinced to act in that way. Thus, the reason that Gauthier defends only a minimal morality is that he believes that this is all that can be rationally required of everyone. Moreover, in the end, Gauthier would like to defend (even if in a limited way) many traditional moral values, such as benevolence or altruism. However, he would insist that ultimately the only plausible way to defend such moral values is by appealing to rational bargaining theory.
Largely from: http://www.iusb.edu/~lzynda/lectures.html
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