Locke
When you see the word ”liberal” you may think of something leftish or socialistic – something opposite to ”conservative.” In our present context, however, the word refers to a general social-political theory which, indeed, underlies our whole social and political system, including both liberals and conservatives. We might better call it classical liberalism. The heart of liberalism in this sense is evident from the word itself. ”Liberalism” comes from the Latin libertas, ”liberty” or ”freedom.” It insists on the freedom of the individual: both freedom from undue external and governmental controls, and freedom for the pursuit of individual interests. Can you identify examples of freedoms from and freedoms for, in the Canadian Constitution or that of the United States?
Classical liberalism may also be called individualism, inasmuch as it affirms the individual over the state, which is seen not as the master but as the servant of the individual, and as the guarantor of the individual’s interests and rights. The primary moving force of the classical liberal perspective was the English philosopher John Locke, who was also one of the founders of modern empiricism. Several ideas are basic to an understanding of Locke’s social-political theory.
First, like many who preceded him, Locke believed that all private and public good is based on the natural law that immediately displays fundamental rights and liberties. As with St. Thomas, the real foundation of the natural law is God, And, as with St. Thomas, this natural and divine law is ”plain and intelligible to all rational creatures” – at least to as many who will take the time and trouble. (Locke’s idea of natural law was no more a contradiction to his empiricism than was St. Thomas’ idea a contradiction to his empiricism. Knowledge, natural law, and all other ideas as well, result from reflection on experience.) Both of these ideas, namely, that God is the objective source of natural law, and that this law can be discovered rationally.
Locke was influenced by Thomas Hobbes, specifically the contractualism ethical system.The conclusion: Men are naturally driven into society. Enter the idea of the social contract, As you know, any contract involves giving up something and getting something in return. A social contract is an agreement between members of a society according to which each forfeits certain rights and privileges in order to preserve others. Thus I see that it is much to my advantage to submit myself to government, to obey laws, etc., if thereby I can secure my fundamental freedoms and rights, and especially if I, as one of the contractors, have a say, either directly (pure democracy) or indirectly (as in representative democracy), in the character of that government, its law, etc.
It is important to see that the order of (1) state of nature, and (2) social contract, is a logical rather than a historical order. How many of us have ever actually lived in a state of nature? Do we not, rather, just find ourselves already members of some social system? No matter. That does not undermine the idea of the social contract, for as long as we remain in such a system (however we got there) we give tacit consent, says Locke, to that system. That is, the social contract is not necessarily something that is drawn up ”once upon a time,” but rather all the time: By their participation in the system, the members continually consent to, agree to, and support the contract. Thus Liberalism suggests a combination of liberty and equality is the highest social ideal and the political system should be a democratic natural system which respects these views.
From: Questions That Matter
Miller, L (ed.), 1996
Rawls' theory of justice (1971) equated justice as 'fairness'. But what are these ideas? According to Rawls there are three fundamental ideas underlying a democratic society. The 'central organizing idea' is that of "society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next." (PL 14) It is accompanied by two companion ideas: the idea of citizens as free and equal persons, and the idea of "a well-ordered society as a society effectively regulated by a political conception of justice." (PL 14). To these Rawls adds the fourth idea that a political conception has as its subject the basic structure of a society and therefore the ability to make changes. (PL 11, 14)
But this is still not sufficient to solve the problem of stability mentioned at the outset. Rawls must go one step further and show that his political conception would be preferred by reasonable persons over any other political conception.
Rawls argues for this point by introducing the idea of an overlapping consensus. (PL 15, ) An overlapping consensus "consists of all the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less just constitutional regime, a regime in which the criterion of justice is that political conception itself." (PL 15) The necessity of an overlapping consensus arises because those with comprehensive moral views must seek some common ground for reaching consensus about principles of justice. The actual circumstances of living in a democratic society then provide individuals with the motivation for accepting a political conception that is not in conflict with each other's comprehensive views. (PL 134)
Rawls' overlapping consensus has been re-formulated in Political Liberalism (1993). It stands on two moral principles. Here is how they are stated in Political Liberalism:
1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal basic liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. (PL 5-6)Largely from: http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/Forum/meta/background/Rawls_pl.html
Dworkin's Theory of Justice
Ronald Dworkin: Equality of Welfare versus Equality of Resources
Ronald Dworkin's theory is intended as a liberal alternative to Rawls' theory
of justice. Dworkin argues for a conception of distributive justice, liberal
equality, where distribution is ambition sensitive, but endowment insensitive.
(That is, it says that society should reward people who achieve greater success
because of their ambition and hard work, but should also compensate those who
are born with fewer natural talents or economic resources.) According to Dworkin,
we can arrive at a correct theory of distribution by developing in rigorous
detail the notion that government should treat all people in society "as
equals." Accordingly, Dworkin's article attempts to answer the question,
"What is Equality?" Dworkin opts for equality of resources, rather
than equality of welfare, as the correct measure of distributive justice. Dworkin
endorses a form of liberal neutrality; that is, he holds that government should
be neutral between differing conceptions of what is good.
Largely from: http://www.iusb.edu/~lzynda/lectures.html
Direct Democracy
In general, the term "direct democracy" usually refers to citizens making policy and law decisions in person , without going through representatives and legislatures. The classic example of this is the New England Town Meeting where anyone from the town who wants to show up to debate and vote on town policy can do so. Until recently, this worked for scores of communities, but low attendance at many modern town meetings has raised questions about whether they are truly democratic.
More recent direct democracy proposals tend to focus on voting schemes (usually high tech) that would allow widespread, virtually continual voting by millions of citizens on whatever proposals surfaced. While useful in building up a buffet of voting methodologies for possible use in other contexts, the lack of organized public deliberation about the issues in question makes such proposals look more like opinion polls than exercises of citizenship. Wise solutions to public problems won't likely come off the top of a hundred million heads.
A third approach to direct democracy -- the "initiative process" adapted by a number of states -- allows anyone to propose a law which, if they can get enough of their fellow citizens to co-sponsor it (usually by signing petitions), can be voted on by the entire electorate in the next election. While apparently empowering the grassroots, this process has in many instances been co-opted by special interest groups, especially monied interests who put initiatives on the ballot to increase their wealth and power in the guise of public benefit -- or to confuse voters about competing initiatives that actually come from the grassroots. Since the monied interests have more resources to hire petition-signature-gatherers and to run powerful advertising campaigns based on extensive marketing surveys and expert PR advice (sometimes very devious, last minute blitzes that can't be answered before the election), there's a real question about how democratic existing initiative processes are. Furthermore, such processes offer no more deliberation than the unproductive media debates that characterize most political campaigns.
So each of these approaches to direct democracy raises questions about how wise or democratic they actually are, in practice. Democracy requires participation by the broad citizenry or at least those affected by the decision. Wisdom requires thoughtful, informed consideration of the issues and consequences involved with various options.
http://www.co-intelligence.org/CIPol_directdemocracy.html
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